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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, online social networks (OSNs) such
as Twitter and Facebook have thrived and experienced rapid
growth to over 1 billion users [1]. A major evolution would
be to leverage the characteristics of OSNs to evaluate the
effectiveness of the many routing schemes developed by the
research community in real-world scenarios. In natural disaster
situations, Internet and cellular communication infrastructures
can be severely disrupted, prohibiting users from notifying
family, friends, and associates about safety, location, food,
water, and other resources. Disasters typically damage in-
frastructure, which increases network traffic demands on any
available undamaged infrastructure, causing congestion and
delays.
Opportunistic communication can seamlessly supplement
Internet connectivity when needed and keep communication
channels open even during high-use and extreme situations.
DTN routing has the ability to deliver data in an intermittent
network, but a major challenge for DTN routing is assessing
real-world performance [2]. To truly understand the reliability
of DTNs and their ability to support social networks, it is
imperative that DTN routing schemes are evaluated in vivo
with use-cases that are replicable, comparable, and available
to a variety of researchers.
In this demo, we showcase AlleyOop Social, a secure
delay tolerant networking research platform that serves as a
real-life mobile social networking application for Apple iOS
devices. AlleyOop Social allows users to interact, publish
messages, and discover others that share common interests
in an intermittent network using Bluetooth, peer-to-peer WiFi,
and infrastructure WiFi. The research platform serves as an
overlay application for the Secure Opportunistic Schemes
(SOS) middleware which allows different routing schemes to
be easily implemented relieving the burden of security and
connection establishment. AlleyOop Social is named after the
basketball play known as an “alley oop”. An “alley oop”
occurs when one player throws the ball close to the basket,
but it is not able to reach the final destination. While the ball
is in flight, a teammate that is closer to the basket catches the
ball and scores. In the same regard, AlleyOop Social enables
wireless mobile users to communicate over longer distances by
Fig. 1. SOS middleware system stack - green represents mobile applications
created by developers, orange represents the modular routing layer consisting
of multiple opportunistic schemes created by academic researchers, blue
represents foundational layers in the middleware that consist of encryption,
authentication, peer discovery, connection management, and data dissemina-
tion. Managers marked with the color “blue” cannot be modified by mobile
application developers or academic researchers.
sending messages that cannot reach the final destination, but
are “caught” by intermediate mobile devices, which continue
to catch and pass the messages until they are delivered to the
final destination.
II. ALLEYOOP SOCIAL RESEARCH PLATFORM
AlleyOop Social is designed to feel familiar to users of
well-known social networking applications such as Twitter
and Facebook. In addition, AlleyOop Social simultaneously
operates as an online and offline delay tolerant mobile social
network. Users download the app and create an account,
enabling them to develop social circles, and then pass and
publish messages to each other. AlleyOop Social is a research
platform allowing users to select any DTN routing protocol
available in the SOS middleware (discussed in Section III)
to disseminate messages. Researchers can perform controlled
studies by asking people to select various protocols in Al-
leyOop Social and post messages. AlleyOop Social gathers
analytics about D2D encounters with friends and AlleyOop
Social users. Unlike the Haggle project [3] which is not fully
functional on iOS and prefers devices to be rooted on Android,
Fig. 2. (a) One-time infrastructure requirement, occurs during account creation to enable DTN security. (b) Decentralized communication between nodes.
AlleyOop Social gathers analytics about encryption/decryption
duration, sign/verify duration, the app was in: foreground,
background, and suspended, along with the size of data that
was disseminated.
III. SECURE OPPORTUNISTIC SCHEMES (SOS)
MIDDLEWARE
The SOS middleware is an underlying framework that
turns the AlleyOop Social research platform into a delay
tolerant mobile social network. The SOS middleware takes
a modular approach to abstract away much of the complex-
ity involved in implementing opportunistic routing schemes
such as device dicovery, establishing D2D connections, and
handling device security and privacy. DTNs are intended to
provide an overlay architecture above the existing transport
layer and ensure reliable routing during intermittency [4].
Building on the knowledge gained from other middleware,
SOS hides the complexity of the network stack (session and
presentation) within the ad hoc manager, message manager,
and routing manager, allowing any mobile application to run
at the application layer as depicted in Figure 1. Different from
other middlewares such as the Haggle Project [3], a separate
instance of the SOS middleware is intended to run within
each mobile application as opposed to a daemon which often
requires devices to be rooted or jailbroken. Designing SOS in
this manner allows for the middleware to be integrated within
individual mobile applications in iOS, enabling the overlaying
applications to support opportunistic communication without
jailbreaking devices along with being compliant with App
Store regulations.
IV. PRIVACY AND SECURITY
In regard to network security there is no “one-size-fits-all”
approach [5]. Security concerns may become exacerbated in
delay tolerant and ad hoc applications where nodes are vulner-
able to attacks such as eavesdropping, denial of service, and
compromised devices. Providing secure communication that
prevents an adversary from accessing and/or modifying data is
a fundamental requirement of any DTN application [6]. Previ-
ous research discusses security in opportunistic applications as
a proof-of-concept, and makes no claim their implementations
are secure [3]. As depicted in Figure 2, AlleyOop Social
introduces a novel, but simple concept and implementation
of an initial layer of security for opportunistic communication
and enables the overlaying mobile application to detect the
identity of its users, send encrypted information, verify the
originating source of the information being forwarded, and
ensure that data have not been modified — all with minimal
dependence on centralized infrastructures.
V. DEMO SETUP
During the demonstration attendees will be able to down-
load AlleyOop Social on their respective iOS devices via
Apple TestFlight. Users can follow friends, post new messages,
as well as toggle between DTN routing schemes inside the
application. We will demonstrate both the online and offline
modes by disconnecting mobile devices from cellular and
WiFi networks. Details of what occurs on every mobile device
when a user creates an account and disseminates messages is
depicted in Figures 2a and 2b respectively.
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